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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

vides, as it formerly did, that its terms shall not become operative until fifteen days
after the judgment has become final.
JAMEs

VIII.

D. McHUGH*

PRACTICE

a. Conditional Sale Contracts Judicial Records
The Act of May 4, 1939,1 makes a conditional sale contract, filed in the prothonotary's office, a judicial record. Just why it was conceived to be necessary
to so provide is difficult to understand, in view of the fact that in Delco Ice Mfg.
Co. v. Frick Co., Inc.,2 the Supreme Court decided this very question. The Court,
in an opinion by Justice Kephart, distinguished between matters recorded in the
office of the recorder of deeds, and papers directed to be filed in the prothonotary's
office. It was held that an act, in providing that a paper be filed in the prothonotary's office, "may give the record a quasi judicial character," and specifically
that thc provisions of the Act of 1925, with reference to conditional sales, do
give the characteristics of a judicial record to the contract filed in pursuance of
said Act. It may be that the Legislature thought that an amendment of the Act
itself, declaring what the Supreme Court had already decided, might be useful to
bring noticc to laymen who have had access only to the Act itself. But will they
understand the significance of the enactment?
Since the decision in the Delco case, it has been decided that the only proper
way to secure the striking off of the entry of satisfaction of a mortgage is by bill
in equity, and that one may not proceed by petition and rule to show cause, since
the recording of a mortgage does not constitute a judicial record.3 In the Delco
Ice Mfg. Co. case it had been held that a proceeding by petition and rule to strike
off a conditional sale contract is proper, though generally such a proceeding is
proper only in the course of pending litigation.
b. Jurisdiction to Modify Support Orders
The Act of June 19, 1939,1 confers "jurisdiction upon the courts of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania over support orders made by it." Section one
provides:
*A.B., Georgetown University, 1927; LL.B., University of Pennsylvania Law School, 1930;
Assistant Counsel, Department of Revenue, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
Ip. L. 43, 69 PURD. STATS. (Pa.) § 403.
2318 Pa. 337, 178 Atf. 135 (1935).
SSee Hand in Hand Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Derry, 24 Pa. D. & C. 635 (1935).
1P. L. 440, 17 PURD. STATS. (Pa.)
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"Any order heretofore or hereafter made by any court of this Commonwealth for the support of a wife, child or parent, may be altered,
repealed, suspended, increased, or amended, and the said court may,
at any time, remit, correct, or reduce the amount of any arrearages, as
the case may warrant."
Section 2 repeals all inconsistent acts.
Notwithstanding the general nle that the power of a court to modify its own
order ends with the term in which the order is made, 2 it had been decided by the
Superior Court that a support order could be modified though the order was entered ten years previously and not appealed from.8 In this case the court reduced the
amount to be paid from ten dollars to five dollars per week and changed the
beneficiary of the payments from the wife to the child, it appearing that the defendant had previously procured a divorce from his wife on the ground of adultery.
The Legislature must have had some doubt as to the correctness of this decision under the then state of the law, but, recognizing the common sense of the
decision, made the provision above quoted.
c.

Revival of Liens of Municipal Corporations

The title of the Act of April 11, 1939,1 states that it is one to authorize certain
specified municipal corporations to revive the liens of any tax or municipal claims
which have been lost, and that it provides for the reinstatement of the liens of such
claims. The law requires that, in order to preserve the lien of a tax or municipal
claim, a sci. fa. must be sued out within five years after the filing of the claim, or
there must be filed a suggestion of non-payment and an averment of default. Either
of these steps will continue the lien for an additional period of five years, provided
judgment be gotten on the sci. fa. within that time, in which case the lien is preserved for a further period of five years from the date of said judgment.
This Act undertakes to reinstate the lien of a tax or municipal claim regardless
of how said lien may have been lost, and provides that the old lien shall "reattach"
to the real estate on which it was once a lien, unless, while the lien was lost, such
real estate was transferred to a "purchaser." Other liens which may have attached
to said real estate while the municipal lien was lost retain their priority over the
municipal lien when it is reinstated.
In Malicks' Petition,la similar "curative" legislation was considered.2 More
than five years had elapsed after the last previous revival of certain county tax
liens on certain lots of ground. Judge Cunningham said:
2

Sce 7 STAND. PA. PRAMrICE (1936)

20, 23.

SCommonwealth ex rel. Sentz v. Sentz, 114 Pa. Super. 75, 173 Ad. 442 (1934).
1P. L. 24, 53 PuD. STATS. (Pa.) § 2037 b.
1R137 Pa. Super. 139, 1A. (2d) 550 (1938).
2Act of july 2, 1937, P. L. 2750, 53 PURD. STATs. (Pa.) § 2037C.
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"Appellants do not directly question the constitutionality of the
act or assert that it deprives them of any vested rights. Similar acts
have so many times been upheld as constitutional by the appellate
courts of this state that it is difficult to see how they could successfully attack it upon this broad ground."
Many of these decisions are mentioned in the opinion.
Howevcr, the Act of April 11, 1939, provides that the lien shall not reattach
if the real estate has been "transferred to any purchaser" during the time when
the lien was lost. It may be asked whether an heir or devisee of the real estate
who acquires title free of lien is to be deemed "a purchaser."
One may inherit real estate upon which there is no lien at the time he
acquires title, and, being so advised, he may proceed to spend large sums of money
in the improvement of such property. It may well be that the municipal claim
could not have been collected from the real estate prior to its improvement, but
that, in its improved condition, the real estate may exceed in value the amount of
the claim, and the now owner be compelled to pay the same, though the claim
arose long before he acquired title.
In Bailey v. Bowman,s it was said:
"In the course of a very few years, it is not only possible, but common, for one who has derived an estate from the bounty or demise of
an ancestor, to become, in an equitable sense, a purchaser of it, ...
That the donee becomes a purchaser by the consequential 'expenditure
of money or labour, is the foundation on which a parol gift of land
to a child is sometimes made effectual against the letter of the statute
of frauds."
Kerper v. Hoch,4 settled, once and for all, that when the lien of debts not
of record of a decedent has been lost, the heirs and devisees of the deceased debtor
hold their titles secure against the creditors of their ancestor. It is said:6
"If the lien of Shep, the creditor of the ancestor, was 'extinguished
by the operation of the act of 1797, upon the land, his obtaining a
judgment afterwards could, upon no principle that I can conceive of,
revive it, or renew to him in any manner a right which he had lost by
his own neglect."
In Tozurison's Estate,6 it is said:
"The court stated that if this contention was sustained it would be
impossible, after the statutory period had elapsed, to safely extend
36 W. & S. 118 (Pa. 1843).
41 Watts 9 (Pa. 1832).
5Id., at 17.
622 Pa. D. & C. 704, 706 (1935).
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credit to the heir or devisee on the assumption that he owned the land
clear of all non-record debts; that the heir or devisee would be unable
to obtain credit because of his ownership; that he could not safely
make improvements to th-e property; and that it would practically
force him to sell the property immediately after the statutory period
had elapsed.
The court held that it was the intention to limit the lien not merely
to bona fide purchasers for value, but also as to heirs and devisees.
The ruling of the court was so eminently sound that it has been
followed without question in later cases: Quigley v. Beatty, 4 Watts
13; Hemphill v. Carpenter, 6 Watts 22; Commonwealth v. Pool, 6
Watts 32; Bailey v. Bowman, 6 W. & S. 118; Wallace's Appeal, 5
Pa. 103; and Loomis' Appeal, 29 Pa. 237."
In W'aits' Esiate,7 it is said:
"Retrospective laws and state laws divesting vested rights, unless ex
post facto or impairing the obligation of contracts, do not fall within
the prohibition contained in the Constitution of the United States,
however, repugnant they may be to the principles of sound legislation."
It thus appears that one may not rely upon the loss of a municipal lien as one
may upon the loss of certain private liens. The former may always "reattach,"
while the latter, once lost, are gone irretrievably.
JOSEPH

IX.

P.

McKEEHAN*

PROPERTY

a. Real: "Spite Fences"
The Act of June 22, 1917' made it unlawful for the owner or occupant of
improved prcmises in any suburban district of the City of Philadelphia to erect
any fence of a greater height than four feet if the additional height was unnecessary
or when the fence was maliciously erected, elevated and maintained for the purpose
of annoying the owner or occupant of the adjoining premises. Such a fence was
declared to be a private nuisance and its erection, etc. made a misdemeanor. This
act was either improper and unconstitutional local legislation under the Pennsylvania Constitution and a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal
7336 Pa. 151, 155, 7A. (2d) 329, 331 (1939).
*Professor of Law, Dickinson School of Law.
1P. L. 623.

